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Introduction
Ecological variability poses enormous challenges for people inhabiting semi-arid
régions all over the world, and for Sahelian pastoralists and cultivators in
particular. The ensuing insecurity about ecological conditions for crops and
pastures is the main problem with which Sahelian populations have to contend to
ensure their survival.
Normally, ecological risks are treated either as an individual matter or as
a stochastic phenomenon striking individuals or groups of people at random.
People's individual stratégies tend to be geared towards the aversion or
minimization of risks by diversification of income sources and low-input
production stratégies, such as extensive cultivation and livestock keeping. Others
have pointed to the necessity of developing collective stratégies to counter risks
and to the fact that societies have been deeply influenced by the extreme
variability in ecological conditions. The French geographer Gallais (1975) coined
the term la condition sahélienne to refer to a number of innate tendencies that
react in a spécifie way to collective and individual risks in Sahelian societies. In
earlier work we hâve argued that thé stratégies and cultural understandings people
develop may be understood as being structured around thé single most important
problem, namely ecological variability (De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1995).
In this chapter, we want to take thé discussion further and argue that
ecological risks are highly politicized phenomena. Historical analyses over the
years have demonstrated that risks in thé Sahel were not evenly distributed over
the population (see Cissoko, 1968; Tymowsky, 1978; Iliffe, 1987; Gado 1993).
Indeed political hiérarchies and rules of access to productive resources acted to
divert thé conséquences of ecological calamities onto other more vulnérable
groups (see De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1993, 2001; Van Dijk, 1999). In short,
individuals and groups occupied structurally different 'risk positions' (Beck,
1992) with respect to their exposure and vulnerability to ecological and other
risks, and were differentially excluded or included in networks mediating access to
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productive resources and sources of capital necessary to mitigate thé conséquences
of risk.
This chapter focuses on thé changing risk positions of social groups since
the beginning of the 20th Century in thé Hayre, a Sahelian région m central Mali
where Fulbe pastoralists vested their power in thé 17th and 18th centuries It
shows how a combination of changes m thé political context, an ecologically
unstable environment and internai politics have led to a new division of risk
positions in society and to thé exclusion of spécifie groups from certain
environmental resources and amenities. The discussion is organized as follows: a
short description of socio-political conditions in central Mali at the end of the 19"1
Century (placed in the context of thé ecology of thé Sahel and of the influence of
French policies on local social and political relations); an analysis of changes atter
Mali's independence (trends after thé political transition of 1991 and thé impact of
administrative decentralization on communities); and an assessment of the link
between régulation of resource and changes in risk positions. A case study of the
situation in Dalla, thé capital village of thé Fulbe chiefdom in thé Hayre,
highlights thé changes in risk positions between thé various social groups. In thé
final section we discuss thé idea of collective action. It seems that individual
différences in risk positions preclude thé formation of political alliances to counter
political, économie and ecological marginalization.
The Sahel
The Ecological Situation
The area known as thé Sahel is a semi-arid région stretchmg in an easterly
direction from thé Atlantic Coast as far as Sudan and beyond. Located just south of
thé Sahara, thé climate is characterized by high températures, high evaporation,
and a rainy season of 3-4 months with an annual rainfall of between 200 and 600
mm. The amount of précipitation is highly variable in time and space. Annual
rainfall in any given year may deviate by as much as 40% below or above thé long-
term average (Put and De Vos, 1999). Even higher déviations in biomass
production have, therefore, been observed (De Leeuw et al., 1993). Combined with
variations in the physical environment such as soil characteristics, slope and
topography, a large variety of production conditions can be observed in any single
year.
Most inhabitants of the Sahel subsist on cereal cultivation, livestock
keeping, gathering, or any combination of thèse activities. Other characteristics
such as population density, main cropping System, type of livestock production
System, and intégration in thé market vary from one Sahelian area to another
(Raynaut, 1997). More recently, temporary or permanent migration to better-
endowed areas in the Sudanic, Guinean and even to the humid forest zone on thé
coast has increased in importance. In order to make thé best use of the variability
in rainfall and physical conditions, migration is used by each group or individual as
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a risk mitigation mechanism. However, the degree and the direction of this
mobility may vary from one year to another and from one group to another. Even
within one group, a large variety of stratégies may exist depending on family
situation, resource endowments, personal history and social position.
The Political Ecology of Risk in the Nineteenth-Century Sahel
At the end of the 19th Century when the colonization of the Sahel by the French
was a reality, Sahelian societies were hierarchically organized. The social strata
were politically defmed. A similar structure could be found in other West African
régions: in the Futanke Empire of Bandiagara, Segou and Kaarta, Fulbe empires in
the Adamawa and Sokoto areas in northern Cameroon and Nigeria and in the Futa
Jallo in Guinea. Politics of the Tamacheck and the Sonrai, though not empires at
the turn of the Century, were also structured in this vein due to the influence of
earlier empires. At the apex of the hierarchy was a political elite alongside a
religieus elite (Islamic or animistic), then a large group of vassals among whom
herders and cultivators were to be found. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the
slaves who formed the class of non-free people as opposed to the other strata who
were regarded as nobles. Between these groups were intermediary groups of ill-
defined status such as merchants, bards and artisans.
These empires were built on the exploitation of a high-risk ecological
environment through control over people. Land was available in abundance but
according to historical sources (Cissoko, 1968; Gado, 1993; Webb, 1995), the
ecological environment was, even throughout the 17th to 20th centuries,
characterized by récurrent droughts and by irregulär rainfall. The wealth of the
empires had to be organized around the exploitation of the environment and of the
people. The latter was done through organized labor in the form of slavery and the
trade in people, the accumulation of livestock and people by raiding neighboring
societies and the control over trans-Saharan and regional trade Systems. This
system of government can be explained as an organization to deal with the risks
inherent in the ecology of the Sahel. Thus a spécifie political organization
developed in which the raiding of other people, enslavement and the déniai of
their rights to own their own means of production were the most basic éléments of
control (cf. Reyna, 1990).
People were assigned a spécifie position in this political framework and
were differentially exposed to risk. By the very fact that slaves had no control over
the fruits of their own labor, and frequently not even over their own land, they
were coerced into handing over most of the commodities they produced. In
situations of scarcity they were the first to face hardship. Vassals, by the nature of
their status, occupied an ambiguous position. In principle they had an independent
position vis-à-vis the political apex. However, they were often forced to give in to
claims by the political class and to hand over part of their production.
Risk was not evenly distributed within these groups. People varied in
their vulnerability to risk depending on the number of livestock and the amount of
land they owned, the size of their family, and social and political relations. Mere
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chance, for example in the case of livestock disease, the incidence of pests, illness
of family members or the localized nature of rainfall, could make the différence
between poverty and a position of relative wealth.
Risk in the Sahel was also closely connected to mobility, which has
always been the principal risk- mitigation mechanism in the région. Slaves were,
in général, immobilized in villages to control their productive activities, whereas
nobles and vassals were allowed to travel and move with their animais to look for
better pastures and opportunities to ensure survival. Vassals, who were cattle
herdsmen, moved regularly with their herds to find the best pastures and water
resources. Religieus clerics traveled to administer religieus services and organize
instruction. With increasing control from the political center, the régulation of
access to resources was centralized and the movements of herdsmen became
regulated (Van Dijk, 1999; De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2001).
Over time, with French colonization, followed by the independence of
African states, this configuration of risk positions changed fundamentally and led
to transformations in the exploitation of natural resources. The two processes of
changing risk positions and changing exploitation of the environment are closely
linked and resulted in a situation in which new forms of coexistence, marginality
and mobility developed.
Nineteenth-Century Fulbe Society in the Hayre
The Hayre is a région in central Mali that has always been on the margin of the
Inland Delta of the Niger, a resource-rich région that has frequently been the object
of contestation. The Hayre is located in the middle of the Niger Bend in central
Mali, south of the mountains Connecting the Bandiagara Plateau with Mount
Hombori. The area can be subdivided into a zone covered with forest on clayey
soils with laterite in the subsoil, and a zone of sand dunes covered mainly with
annual and perennial grasses, herbs and sparse trees. Most of the cultivators and
groups of sedentary Fulbe pastoralists can be found in permanent villages at the
foot of the mountains in the north of the area, where the water table is closer to the
surface. Towards the sand dunes, camps of mobile Fulbe pastoralists are to be
found as well as hamlets of cultivators who moved into this area because of lack of
space in their home villages near the mountains and on the Bandiagara Escarpment
and Plateau. A more elaborate description of the area and its position in the
regional political ecology can be found in De Bruijn and Van Dijk (1995,2001).
At the beginning of the 19th Century, the Fulbe gained control over much
of central Mali and built the Maasina Empire. The Diina as it came to be known,
was led by a pious Muslim, Sheeku Aamadu, who tried to turn it into a strictly
organized theocracy. However, the influence of the rules and reorganization did
not extend to the periphery. In the Hayre where another Fulbe group had gained
power in the 17th-18th Century (De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 2001) the Maasina
influence was significant and contributed to the basic social organization of the
communities.
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Different population groups lived in the Hayre. Cultivators and herdsmen
made use of the area but both livelihoods were clearly separate. The herdsmen
were organized m loosely structured bands that also undertook mutual raids to
accumulate cattle and people. The herders were Fulbe and Tamacheck. Why the
Fulbe gained dominance m the area is not clear. It might have been due to the
support they received from the larger Fulbe empires or to their need to ensure
access to pastureland and to défend their herds against other invading or raiding
Fulbe or Tamacheck groups. The fact is that they became the dominant political
force in the région, and established Maasina with Dalla as the main village. Fulbe
political leadership went hand in hand with the Islamization of the région (see
Angenent et al, 2002).
As to be expected, the cultivators in the région were sedentary. They
lived in organized settlements with a high degree of central political control to
minimize the risk of plunder from neighboring tribes. Most of the cultivators
belonged to the Sonrai, Dogon, Kurminkoobe and Bambara ethnie groups.
The Distribution ofEcological Risk
A number of divisions in social and political terms can be discerned at the end of
the 19th Century based on ethnie affiliation, modes of subsistence, religion
(Muslims versus animistic groups), and raiding or non-raiding groups. Internally
these societies were also divided into social catégories based on power différences
and on the notion of nobility that was linked to being a free person. Within Fulbe
society this hierarchy followed the scheme outlined above mcluding the political
elite (the weheebe), the religieus ehte (the moodibaabe), noble vassal groups who
herded cattle (the jallube), nobel merchants and courtesans (the diawaambé),
artisans (the nyeeybe) who are linked to the noble people, and slaves (the maccube)
who are considered non-noble, non-free and of minor status at the bottom of the
social order.
The slaves were the labor reservoir. Among them, a division was made
between various catégories of slaves depending on the status of their master and
the slaves' internai organization or hierarchy. Within these social layers, further
divisions were made in a hierarchical way between being more noble or more slave
than the other. There were many former free cultivators among the slave
population who were simply incorporated by the noble people to work for them.
After all, all the land in the Hayre belonged to the noble Fulbe and the political and
religious elite had most of the land under its control.
For the Jallube herders land had a different significance. They depended
on access to pastureland and not to small cultivable plots. The herdsmen also
possessed house slaves, but did not own slaves or estâtes as the elite did. In fact it
was the political and religious elite who owned all the land and who decided who
could have access to it. Being a slave may have been préférable to being a poor
wandering herder because a slave at least had access to land through his master,
who in turn wanted his part of the harvest.
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During times of drought however, access to the produce of the land was
reserved for the noblemen who sent their slaves away if times became too hard.
These slaves migrated temporarily or simply died. Many herdsmen lost their cattle
and became poor people and potential slave labor for the elite, or they migrated to
see if they could find a niche elsewhere. In the political circumstances of the time,
it seems highly probable that they men became slaves in another political
constellation (see Iliffe, 1987).
Free cultivators were always prey to the warring Fulbe in need of labor
for their estâtes and their houses and probably also for trade in order to generale
revenue. To protect themselves against the Fulbe these cultivators built their
villages on the escarpment and developed a warning system against raiding bands.
The Dogon system is extensively described in this way (Gallais, 1965, 1975; Van
Beek and Banga, 1992).
The assignment of risk positions was orchestrated by the political elites
who favored the Islamic clergy because of their spiritual qualities, and some
groups of artisans. The pastoral groups were largely left to their own devices as
long as they handed in tribute and participated in raids and wars (but were
exploited in the sense that they were the guardians of the herds of the noble elite).
The elites defended the grazing lands of the pastoralists, but this service was of
limited value in drought years. The slaves carried the largest bürden during
drought times. They often died, were sent away, or had to work hard in order to
produce food for their masters.
On the other hand the social hierarchy worked as a safety valve for people
who had lost their basic source of subsistence, for example a herder who had lost
his cattle. A poor herder could be incorporated into the social system as a slave or
in another lower group and thus survive difficult times. Nevertheless most poor
would have opted to leave and become a slave elsewhere.
Thus the division of risk positions was in the hands of the political elite
who were supported in this by the Islamic clergy. Herders as well as slaves had to
live according to the whims of the elite who controlled all social relations and
access to land and other resources.
Changes in the Twentieth Century
French colonization brought fundamental changes to Fulbe livelihood structure. In
the course of twenty years they establilhed an effective monopoly on organized
violence throughout the Sahel. This* had a tremendous impact on the organization
of the management of natural resources and the economy. The position of
cultivators, who were contained-jwiMn wèll-defined areas where they enjoyed
relative safety and protection from raijïiig, altered fundamentally. Now protected
by the French colonial administratiojufthey were able to expand their area of
cultivation and within forty years*^hey»had;occupied most of the area of sand dunes
south of the Hayre (See Gallailr £975). Villages of Sonray and Dogon dëscended
from the cliffs to the plains.
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For some time the Fulbe were able to prevent occupation of their
pastureland because of the difficult water situation but in thé end were unable to
stop further encroachment on their land. The territorial control they exercised was
based on military prowess, which acquired no légal récognition of the colonial
state since it declared all the vacant and unoccupied land to be the private property
of the state. Pastureland and forest were both regarded as vacant and unoccupied.
This process continues today and graduaüy all the remaining open areas of the
plains are being put under cultivation.
Though thé French officially abolished slavery, it took much longer for
thé maccube to acquire some degree of independence. The libération of slaves was
not a top priority for thé French administration and their span of control in remote
areas such as thé Hayre was so limited that they were not able to exercise daily
control there. In fact they gave thé political elite a free hand in maintaining control
over the court slaves who were simply registered as family members of the
noblemen. The name of thé former slave group changed to riimaybe, which means
'liberated slaves'. Today thé riimaybe group consists of ail groups who had servile
status (bondage) in pré-colonial times.
A major change in this field was triggered by the famine of 1913-14. In
the absence of modern inventions such as food aid and labor migration, this
famine, recorded as the worst of the 20th Century, ravaged the Hayre. Whole
quarters of villages were wiped out (see also Suret-Canale, 1964; Marchai, 1974).
Slaves died in their scores or were sent away to more fertile areas around the lakes
northwest of the Hayre, the available food havmg been seized by the nobles. Since
slavery had officially been abolished, nothing obliged the slaves who went away
ever to return to their masters and a large number seem to have broken with their
masters during this period.
After the Second World War, French colonial policy took a new turn.
Elections were organized and could only be held if all citizens were free and equal
in the eyes of the law. This in effect dealt the final blow to the institution of
slavery. Relations of dependence expressed in exchange of labor and resources
continued to exist between noblemen and their former slaves but officially power
could no longer be exercised.
The vassal herdsmen were gradually freed from their overlords. They
were no longer needed as the basis of military power and they no longer had access
to labor and cattle in the form of booty from raids. Unlike the slaves of the political
elite, these slaves took their independence and their former masters lost a source of
manual labor. They continued to herd their cattle and, compelled by lack of labor,
had to undertake cereal cultivation themselves thus beconüng semi-settled
transhumant livestock keepers.
Their overlords, the weheebe chiefs, had to adjust to the new power. They
became part of the colonial administrative System that intervened actively in their
affairs and deposed traditional authorities when they were not performing their
tasks according to their standards. The overlords were made responsible for the
collection of taxes and became complicit in the colonial administration, since they
were allowed to keep some of the taxes for themselves. As a result they were no
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longer accountable to their subjects but instead to thé colonial administration.
Having lost their military function, they tried to maintain an image of importance
by participating in thé colonial administration's festivities, showing up with ail
their former military pomp (see Angenent et al, 2002). In short, thé extraversion of
Fulbe society in thé Hayre became a fact.
After independence many more things began to change and new players
entered the field. Under thé First Republic, headed by Modibo Keita, attempts were
made to break thé last vestiges of power of the traditional authorities regarding
control over labor and over natural resources. State-run enterprises were made
responsible for agricultural production, collectivization of land was promoted, and
new government services were given the task of exercising control over all aspects
of life, such as forest resources, land tenure, the development of livestock and
cereal production.
After 1968 the pendulum swung back when the Second Republic was
established. The socialist experiments were discontinued but attempts to modernize
agricultural production were intensified. The reason for tins was the beginning of a
period of devastating drought, which lasted from 1968 until the mid-1990s. Aid
money poured into the country to help reform the agricultural sector that was
regarded as backward, unsustainable and ultimately responsible for the bad
ecological situation and the désertification of the Sahel.
These efforts proved as futile and ineffective as the attempts at
collectivization and modernization had in the early 1960s (see Van Dijk and De
Bruijn, 1995; De Bruijn and Van Dijk, 1999a, 1999b) and only contributed to a
further érosion of the socio-économie position of important sectors of the
population. At the beginning of the 1990s, these policies were abandoned after the
fall of the Second Republic. The Third Republic embarked upon an ambitious
scheme of administrative and political decentralization with the aim of restoring
local accountability for the welfare of the population (see Van Dijk and Hesseling,
2002).
This process of administrative decentralization could be potentially
bénéficiai for local population groups because it brings politics closer to
marginalized groups. On the other hand it is feared that the potential for conflict
will increase since there is no longer a central power to quash thèse conflicts, and
that processes leading to exclusion and decentralization will just be re-enacted aï
this lower administrative level (Van Dijk and Hesseling, 2002). Further research is
warranted since these decentralized administrative structures only starled to
function recently.
The Depastoralization of Natural Resource Management in Dalla
In this section the focus is on the spécifie changes that hâve occurred in thé division
of access to natural resources. It is the story of thé graduai marginalization of the
pastoral groups in the area over the 20th Century. Their risk position has become
worse than the risk position of the former slave groups. We turn our attention to thé
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situation in and around Dalla, the oldest capital of the cmeftaincy of the Fulbe in the
Hayre.
Changing Risk Positions in the Chiefdom of Dalla
Although the elite of Dalla lost all ils administrative powers and was deprived of its
former slave labor, it has kept a firm grip on politics and natural resource
management around the village. Contrary to the situation amongst the Dogon, the
riimaybe were not helped to acquire land, although their weak position vis-à-vis the
Weheebe was noticed by the French colonial government. A French lieutenant wrote
to his superiors: 'J'ai appris que les Bérébés (Weheebe: authors) empêchaient les
Riimaybe et Habe d'étendre leurs lougans, dans le but évident d'empêcher les
malheureux se pouvour jamais racheter'} The riimaybe did not have the right to
acquire land if they were directly put to work in their master's house. If a Dalla noble
wanted to seil his land to a diimaajo (pi. riimaybe), thé Chief of Dalla prohibited it
and bought thé plot for himself. This continued to be so m Dalla even after the
riimaybe were completely liberated in 1946. The chief was also given the authority
to patrol the bush to enforce the French Forestry Code and to exploit it with local
labor for his own profit.2 He could thus also prevent the clearing of fields in the bush.
The 1968-73 drought was bad in the Hayre but did not have a disastrous
effect on the local economy. The harvests were poor and livestock perished but the
population disposed of suffïcient reserves to survive the dry spell. At least this is how
the population remembers that period of drought today. What was new, however,
was the aid in food and money frorn the international community, which made the
situation casier even though part of this aid was siphoned off by corruption at the
level of the administration. The drought of the 1980s had a much more profound
impact. Livelihoods were severely affected by these droughts and a large proportion
of the population was forced to seek refuge in more fertile régions, having lost their
livelihood in the Hayre.
In the post-drought years, the problems have not decreased. Conflicts over
natural resources have risen, and it is easy to see that, with the advancement of time
and an increase in drought and poverty, the pastoral groups around Dalla have lost
out to their competitors, the Dogon, diawaambe, weheebe and riimaybe. Cultivators
from Dogon villages have starled to clear fields in pasture areas and the riimaybe of
Dalla have sought new opportunities to occupy the land. The diawaambe, some of
whom grew rieh during the droughts, have laid claims to both pasture and
agricultural land.
Compétition between the Dogon and the Fulbe The following case illustrâtes the
process of changing positions in local politics. In 1964, even before the droughts,
the Chief of the Dogon of Diamweli, Kansa Ongoiba, asked the Chief of Dalla for
permission to clear fields on the Seeno-Manngo at Petil Camil. Yerowal Nuhum,
the Chief of Dalla refused. But after Nuhum's death and after the 1968-73
drought, the Dogon of Diamweli began to clear land on the Seeno-Manngo at this
site and established a cultivation hamlet, i.e. a hamlet only used during the
ïason.
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cultivation se  They feit they were in a strong position because one of Kansa's
sons had become attaché de cabinet in the Ministry of Interior. Bukary Yerowal
Dikko, who was chief at that moment united his most important Fulbe deputy
chiefs from Karena, Nani and Sigiri and went to the chef d'arrondissement, who
sided with the Dogon. The Fulbe attacked the administrator and were put in prison.
A brother of the Chief of Dalla, who worked in Segou as teacher, was called to
intervene on their behalf with the Commandant de Cercle, one administrative level
higher. He agreed to arrange matters on condition that the Fulbe would not claim
the tax money they were entitled to from thé administration (as thé American
government compensated thé Malian government for lost tax revenues provided
they agreed not to levy taxes on livestock during the drought). The Fulbe agreed,
the money was left with thé administration and thé Dogon were removed from thé
Seeno-Manngo. In 1976 the conflict flared up again. The district administrator, a
Pullo (pi. Fulbe) this time, called ail thé parties together and decided in favor of the
Fulbe. A covenant was signed agreeing that from then onwards no new cultivation
sites would be allowed on thé Seeno-Manngo and that thé area would be reserved
as pasture. However, in 1984 thé Dogon of Boumban, just south of Dalla, bribed
thé Commandant de Cercle and obtained permission to cultivate on thé Seeno-
Manngo near Daajem.3
Changing positions within Fulbe society Another conflict over land, between
Dalla and Karena and between various groups in Dalla, shows that thé Fulbe were
also divided internally. In thé early 1980s thé riimaybe of Dalla started clearing
land on various occasions in thé bush between Dalla and Karena. The Fulbe of
Karena and three other pastoral settlements protested because thé fields were
located near a number of small ponds that provided water for livestock in thé rainy
season. Not only did thé fields hinder access to thé ponds but thé Fulbe would also
run the risk of having to pay compensation money if their livestock accidentally
damaged crops in nearby fields. The riimaybe, on the other hand, appealed to
ancestral rights to these fields. In the distant past there had been Kourminkoobe
villages in this area and one can still find the remnants of blast furnaces. The
riimaybe consider themselves, having become free, the rightful heirs of the
Kourminkoobe who were captured by the Fulbe. The Chief of Dalla, Bukary
Yerowal, backed mem. However, under pressure from the pastoralists hè turned
down the claim by the riimaybe.
Later, after the drought of 1985 the Chief of Karena visited the Chief of
Dalla, with a request to reconsider the occupation of these fields. After all, the Fulbe
had lost their cattle and were eager to cultivate the more fertile land in dépressions
where water was available. At that moment the bard of Dalla and some Diawaambe,
who cleared the land without anyone knowing about it, had already occupied the
best parts of the area. The Fulbe of Bankassi, the seulement nearest to the fields, still
regard this land as having been stolen from them. They considered the area as
pastureland that should remain so, and given the provisions of the Land Tenure
Code they were correct. Their ancestral claims were not recognized under the
provisions of the Land Tenure Code with respect to the clearing of land because all
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land that has been vacant for more than ten years automatically becomes the
(private) property of the state. Fields in this area would restrict other activities and
were too close to water resources. Permission to clear fields here would have to be
refused given the régulations in force. The administration did not change this
situation because the agricultural officer responsible was bribed. So, this
encroachment on pastoral land was made in silence.4
In the end the Fulbe lost because they were deprived of their source of
political power, cattle that had perished m the drought. They were also no longer
necessary as political and military support for the weheebe because the Fulbe armies
had ceased to exist. In the past the conflict of interest between pastoralism and
cultivation, which is equally a conflict between flexibility and the centralized
political organization of the Maasina Empire, was regulated by the management
scheme of the Diina. Now even the Diina rules are left for what they are and the
management of natural resources is being taken over by the Malian state, which
represents sedentary and anti-pastoral interests.
Changing positions in the village of Dalla The last conflict to be discussed here is
even closer to the heart of power of the chiefdom. It was a sévère threat to social
cohésion m the village of Dalla and concerned areas set aside as pasture way back
m the 19* Century, the harima and burti. The harima is reserved pastureland next
to the village meant for small ruminants and burti are strips of land acting as
passageways for animais during times of cultivation.
The harima is one of the most fertile pièces of land in Dalla. Animais have
dropped their dung on the soil for âges and though in the past most was transported
to the surrounding fields, a lot of nutrients have remained in the soil. With declining
numbers of cattle and growing pressure on land around Dalla, as testified by the
accounts of conflicts above, pressure on the chief to open the harima for cultivation
also mounted, although this would militate against Diina rules and even modern
législation since customary rights were recognized in this body of law. The Chief of
Dalla, Bukary Yerowal, and later on Hamidou Yerowal gave in to pressure but
decided that it would be better to take advantage of the harima, and thus were
among to first to occupy a field as near as possible to the village and a cotton garden
where they could plant mango trees. As a result the whole village rushed to snatch
their share of the available land. At the moment only the market place and degraded
parts have escaped occupation.
Apart from the conflicts between villagers about the boundaries dividing
their newly established fields, a major conflict arose in 1991 over the pastoral
vocation of the harima and the burti. When the rush on land occurred around 1985
there were hardly any people with livestock but by 1991 some diawaambe had been
able to reconstitute considérable herds and were confronted with the problem of
where to leave their animais at night. All the land around the village is under millet
cultivation and fields block all road access. They asked the chief to remove
occupation of this land. The chief gave in and had his brother and nephew lay out
the burti. The Rümaybe occupying this land responded by threatening to chase the
animais. The diawaambe then put more pressure on the chief, declaring that they
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would complain to the administration if he did not force the Rümaybe off the burti.
This would mean the chief would be removed from office.5 The chief consulted the
former Imam, his father-in-law, as to what to do. The well-respected old man, who
is regarded as a saint in Dalla, took the side of the diawaambe because it was closer
to the Islamic doctrine of the Hayre. He called the Rümaybe's spokesmen and told
them to stop the conflict and abandon the fields on the burti, harima and some of the
ponds that were in contested territory. Now the hierarchy has been turned
completely on its head. The former subjects of the pastoralists, the diawaambe and
the Rümaybe, are contesting hegemony over natural resources in Dalla. Nor is the
chief any longer in control as hè has to resort to the moral authority of the Islamic
clergy.
From these conflicts it becomes clear that the influence of the jallube
pastoralists in Dalla has become insignificant. In the first conflicts in the 1960s the
weheebe defended their interests. Later on they supported the riimaybe who were
looking for land to cultivate because of the declining harvests vis-à-vis pastoral
interests. In the conflicts following the droughts there seems to be a return of
pastoral power in Dalla but this power is not represented by the jallube pastoralists.
Instead diawaambe entrepreneurs, who manage commercial herds, have become the
champions of the pastoral way of life, and moodibaabe, defending what they believe
to be Islamic orthodoxy.
Another important change in comparison with the past is the référence that
is made to the modern state as the ultimate authority to appeal to in case of serious
conflict. The extent to which people are able to win conflicts is closely related to
their bargaining power in relation to the administration. In the first conflict, the chief
was able to turn down the appeal without recourse to the state. After the drought in
1973, the administration had to be bribed, just as in the second conflict bribery
resolved the conflict. In the third conflict, the threat of appeal to the state against the
chief was sufficient to force a (temporary) solution. In this game of power the
Jallube no longer play a rôle. In Dalla itself there are no Jallube families left. In the
surrounding areas there are three small hamlets of Jallube, Boussouma about 2.5 km
away with seven families, Hoggo Loro 1.5 km away consisting of one family, and
Bankassi with four families. The rest have migrated to other parts of Mali or sought
refuge on the Seeno-Manngo.
The parties in all these conflicts agrée on nothing except for the fact that
the power of the Jallube is at present negligible. With the droughts and the loss of
their cattle they have lost their only source of power. Their political power has
disappeared although they have often got their way by bribing the administration. In
the absence of cattle they have no bargaining power left. This weak position is the
result of a long historica! process. However, the position of the riimaybe as a group
of cultivators is developing in reverse. They are profiting from state policy and
agrarian developments in the région. Although in ideology they are still regarded as
the lowest stramm of society in economie terms and also in social reality, they have
a rauch better position than the pastoralists.
li
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The Encroachment of 'Outsiders' on the Seeno-Manngo
To complete the history of the relations between the Inner Delta and the Hayre we
will briefly recount the events concerning the pastures of the Seeno-Manngo. This
history sketches the impact of pohcy with regard to natural resource use on a
regional scale on the risk positions of the various groups in the Hayre. In regional
politics, the influence of the Fulbe elites is negligible. So even if they wanted to
défend the rights of their pastoral vassals they do not have the means to do so.
Until fairly recently this vast area of high-quality range6 was only used
during the rainy season and a short period afterwards by local herds from the Hayre
in the north and from the Seeno-Gonndo and the Mondoro area in the south. The use
of the area was dictated by the seasonal availability of water. After a period of
détérioration at the end of the 19* Century, herds prospered once again in the
colonial period and the French saw the danger of overexploiting the delta. At the
same time they also wanted to develop the livestock sector. They appreciated the
potential of the Seeno-Manngo, not only for pasturing animais in the growing season
but also in the dry season. Their reasoning was that pressure on the pastures in the
Inner Delta could be relieved (which they considered overexploited or converted to
rice cultivation). The development of watering points on the Seeno-Manngo could
primarily serve to keep the herds on the drylands for a longer period of time
(Doutresoulle, 1952).
This policy was based on the assumption that all the herdsmen from the
drylands would direct their herds to the Inner Delta of the Niger after the rains had
stopped. This is, however, only true of the Fulbe herdsmen who have lost most of
their pastures to the colonization of their territory by Dogon '"ütivators who
descended from the Bandiagara Escarpment after the French conquest of central
Mali in 1893 (see Gallais, 1975). For the Hayre, Seeno-Manngo and the area
around Mondoro this is not the case. The herds in these zones remain as far as
possible in their home région. Herdsmen and cultivators alike practice the
cultivation of millet on permanent fields. This is only possible because of the
manure that is produced by the cattle and goats that remain in these zones during
the dry season. The watering points that they developed by themselves over the
course of the 20* Century were the basis for this shift to agro-pastoral land use
(Van Dijk, 1995). The external policy to open up the Seeno-Manngo disturbed this
system.
During the colonial period attempts were already being made to draw the
Seeno-Manngo into the orbit of the delta herds. Between 1956 and 1958 seven
boreholes were drilled and equipped with windmills to draw water. The exploitation
of the pastures and agricultural land around these boreholes caused considérable
strife among the région's inhabitants. As there were no provisions for the
maintenance of the windmills, they were soon out of order again (around 1960)
(Gallais and Boudet, 1979). After the 1969-73 droughts, another attempt was made
to develop the Seeno-Manngo. The livestock service, with loans from the World
Bank, starled a well-digging program (see Gallais 1984) to make more permanent
exploitation of the Seeno-Manngo possible. However, according to the pastoralists,
^ff
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this also attracted cultivators to the area (ODEM, 1978). In addition there were more
grandiose plans to drill a number of boreholes in the middle of the dune area and
equip them with solar pumps that supposedly demand minimal maintenance. From
this scheme only one borehole is still functioning (see Van Dijk and De Bruijn,
1995).
With the drought of 1983-85, the effects of the government wells became
clearer. Enormous herds from the north and even from Burkina Faso were attracted
to the Seeno-Manngo, one of the few areas where water and some range were still
available. This led to enormous overstocking and, as a result, 75% of the local
livestock perished. The herdsmen of the Seeno-Manngo were not able to ward off
the outsiders because they had no say over the modern wells.7
Since then, every rainy season sees the arrivai in the Seeno-Manngo of
numerous herds owned by urban traders and civil servants from the Inner Delta,
conducted by salaried herdsmen. They cause damage to the fields of the local
inhabitants and use up the range. They try to stay in the area as long as possible
because the pastures of the waiting areas near the Inner Delta are also overexploited.
The pastures in the inland delta also have decreased enormously. The livestock
service tried to promote this tendency by deepening the ponds, creating new wells
and improving the old wells but when pastoralists wanted help to improve or repair
their own wells their requests were turned down. Officials refused to discuss the
issue of land tenure around the government wells. The local pastoralists want this
issue to be settled before any new initiatives are taken. Specifïcally they are worried
about their position vis-à-vis newcomers.8
Decentralization in Mali
Since the political transition in 1991, the Mali government has embarked on a
project of political decentralization. In 1999 the final stage was realized with
élections for mayors and the establishment of rural communities. The idea of this
process is to bring governance closer to the ordinary people so that they themselves
may make décisions about their lives.
Dalla has become a small rural commune consisting of 18 villages. The
constellation of this commune reflects power relations. In fact it consists of a large
village of noble people: weheebe, moodïbaabe and diawaambe and their riimaybe,
separate riimaybe villages and some temporary hamlets of herdsmen. The beweejo
mayor of this commune found his support among riimaybe and weheebe. He is a
brother of the present chief of Dalla. Thejallube pastoralists are invisible, living in
camps on Dalla territory but having no say in this political game. It is clear that
they were hardly involved in the élection campaigns. For them the chief is another
beweejo who is not prepared to represent them when necessary.
The weheebe retain a firm grip on all matters concerning land use and
politics. Though the riimaybe are nominally free, they are entirely dependent on the
weheebe for access to land since the land around Dalla remains in the hands of the
latter. In return the weheebe rely on their votes in local municipal-council élections.
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In another place inhabited predominantly by pastoralists, the pastoralists
have claimed a commune of their own, having obtained permission from the
government to establish it and to elect their own mayor and community council. This
independent stance has lts histoncal roots in pré-colonial urnes when this village
claimed independence from the Fulbe chiefdoms in the région. However, over the
past decades numerous Dogon agriculturalists have settled in hamlets on their
pastureland and turned thousands of hectares into cropland. To secure their claim to
this cropland they are trying to develop water resources with the help of outside
agencies. The pastoralists have no way either of preventing these people settling on
their village land or of forcing them to abandon their pastureland. Thus the ability to
regulate access to territory, pastureland and cropland is dependent on the spécifie
context and political organization of each community and the status of its inhabitants
within their own society.
Finally the different groups in the Hayre have changea places in the
hierarchy of risk positions: the diawaambe and rümaybe have become better off,
while Ui&jallube pastoralists have become worse off.
Inclividual Différences and Collective Action
One wonders whether there is not a basis for collective action that may counter this
kind of process. It is clear that the traditional socio-political hierarchy does not
provide a basis for this and only when it comes to imposing state policies on local
pastoral groups do these hierarchical relations serve a purpose. However, as was
shown in the preceding section, the way these relations are operated only serves to
deepen the marginalization of the pastoral groups. The rise in the political position of
the groups surrounding the traditional political elite in Dalla (diawaambe, rümaybe,
moodibaabe, nyeeybe) is not the conséquence of their collective efforts and
concerted action. They are carried on the stream of political developments in the
région that favors their interests: the favorable policy for sedentary agriculture and
the decentralization process, and their influence as electorale in the élections. The
reverse is true for the pastoral jallube.
Of course these groups are not an undivided whole and not all members
have the same risk position. In this chapter we have chosen to present the social
catégories as collectivities because, as social history shows, they have functioned and
today still operate as such in local politics. People have a sense of belonging to a
social category. It is part of their ideology.
However, this does not mean that these social catégories are the basis for
collective action as a number of structural factors inhibit the development of
institutions or movements for collective action. In the past, collective action could
only be set in motion by thé political center through thé vertical ties with subordinate
social catégories The first is thé fragmented nature of Fulbe political organization.
Society is not only subdivided in status catégories but, at the level of thèse groups,
organization is highly segmentary in nature. Between thé vassal pastoralists, thé only
group with sufficient people and status to challenge thé authority of local leadership
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and thé administration, all kind of opposition exists amongst thé various lineages
composing this group, making it difficult to organize or even to envisage a unified
group. For political leaders it is easy to play a game of divide and rule.
Another major factor inhibiting collective action is the covariance of risk,
mearang that people in the same risk position have to face the same risks at the same
time. For them it is more profitable to invest in their own enterprise than in collective
devices for risk mitigation (Platteau 1991). This is clear when one analyzes collective
mechanisms for thé redistribution of productive resources such as land and livestock.
These are all geared to the transfer of property to a restricted group of kin and do not
involve a kind of solidarity or genera! reciprocity towards members of the
community (Van Dijk, 1994; De Bruijn, 1999).
The third point follows on from this. Though groups of people may be
attributed similar characteristics within a structural political framework this
demonstrates little about a spécifie individuaPs particular situation or risk position.
Différences between individuals and families in wealth and vulnerability to risk are
so vast that they preclude the formulation of any common interest in relation not only
to risk mitigation stratégies but also to outside intervention and contextual changes.
The image of an egalitarian pastoral society is a myth (Sobania, 1990).
Conclusion
We have tried to show some aspects of the relation between a high degree of risk and
the political ecology of pastoral societies in the Sahel. The concept of risk position
was introduced to pinpoint the position of groups and individuals in relation to their
exposure to risk and vulnerability. With the help of this framework we have shown
how the structural position of the former vassals of Fulbe chiefdoms, leading a
pastoral way of life, has eroded to such an extent that they have become the most
marginalized group in Fulbe society. On the other hand developments have enabled
the former slave groups to climb up the risk hierarchy.
During the colonial period the Fulbe political elite became detached from
their following, the vassals. Today they are no longer accountable to their former
vassals but rather to their former slaves who form the basis of their political power in
the sedentary villages and are far more accessible for community council élections.
The mobile pastoralists have lost their claims to land and, given their mobile
existence, have moved out of the political centers to marginal areas beyond the reach
of élection campaigns to areas where no or only limited cultivation takes place.
A more detailed analysis of recent political change with respect to
administrative decentralization reveals that this process is continuing unabated.
However, the scope for collective action to counter these transformations is limited
given a number of structural factors in the organization of Fulbe society, and the
group of former vassals in particular.
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Notes
1 National Archives file 2E-4: Politique indigène: Correspondances cercle de Bandiagara:
1899-1907, Le Lieutenant Gâteau à cercle de Macina, 18 April 1903.
2 National Archives file 3R-6: Foresterie au Soudan, Le Gouverneur des Colonies et le
Gouverneur du Soudan Français à M.M. les Administrateurs Commandants des Cercles de
la Colonie, 15 December 1927. National Archives file 3R-39: Eaux et Forêts: 1916-1918,
L'Administrateur en chef de 1-er Classe à Ms. Les Administrateurs des Cercles et le
Commandant de la Région de Tombouctou 15 April 1916.
3 This story was told by Moussa Yerowal Dikko, then a teacher in Segou, who intervened on
behalf of his family members with thé Commandant de Cercle. The other leading persons in
this conflict, Kansa Ongoiba, Yerowal Nuhum Dikko and Bukary Yerowal Dikko, have all
died. The administrators retired and moved out of the région.
4 This conflict was related to us by several informants, among whom the late bard, himself
one of thé people involved, Allay Jangiina, thé former aid of chief Yerowal Nuhum, and
several Fulbe from settlements around Dalla, Nu Saidu Jallo from Hoggo Loro and Hamma
Ngarya Jallo of Bankassi.
5 Many more incidents occurred in the past mat would hâve justified his removal. This last
grave incident would tilt thé balance.
6 Doutresoulle (1952: 66) estimâtes thé potential area of thé Seeno-Manngo, Seeno-Gonndo
and Seeno Mondoro at 5,000,000 ha.
7 In addition a Tuareg chief got permission to equip one of thé boreholes drilled in thé 1950s
with a motor pump and watered his own cattle and those of his dependents in this way for as
long as ne deemed necessary.
8 In our présence, a senior officiai at thé Ministry of Natural Resources and Livestock
Keeping asked local herdsmen to cooperate with thé Delta herdsmen in order to manage the
Seeno-Manngo. The local herdsmen were very shocked. They feit they had lost their
customary rights to thé Seeno-Manngo.
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